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CONSTITUTIONS: MAKING 
CONSTITUTIONS IN THE SOUTH 
PACIFIC: ARCHITECTS AND 
EXCAVATORS 
Dr Alex Frame * 
I CONCERNING DEFINITIONS 
In the Hamlyn Lectures for 2000, Anthony King chose as his title a provocative 
question – "Does the United Kingdom Still Have a Constitution?". 1 The answer, it seems, 
depends on the definition of "Constitution" adopted by the respondent.  If the 1733 
definition of the Tory politician and autocratic parliamentarian, Lord Bolingbroke (1678­ 
1751) were taken as the starting point, we could be led towards a negative answer. 
Bolingbroke proposed that: 2 
By Constitution we mean, whenever we speak with Propriety and Exactness, that Assemblage 
of Laws, Institutions and Customs, derived from certain fix'd Principles of Reason...that 
compose the general System, according to which the Community hath agreed to be govern'd. 
The Hamlyn Lecturer pointed out that it might be difficult to establish that the United 
Kingdom exhibited a coherent and principled "assemblage" to which the community had 
"agreed", so as to satisfy Bolingbroke's definition.  The "fix'd Principles of Reason" might 
be particularly difficult to identify in the hotchpotch of rules and arrangements which 
had developed in relation to government in the United Kingdom.  Troubling too would 
* Barrister, Dr Frame has advised extensively on constitutional questions in the South Pacific. 
1 Anthony King "Does the United Kingdom Still Have a Constitution?" in The Hamlyn Lectures 2000 
(Sweet and Maxwell, London, 2001). 
2 Viscount Bolingbroke "Dissertation on Parties" (1733) in Henry Saint­John Works (1809 ed) iii, 157. 
Quoted in King, above, 80.
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be the overlapping and conflicting doctrines of the European relationship, and the ad hoc 
manner of their evolution. 
On the other hand, Anthony King's own working definition would certainly allow us 
to discover a "Constitution" in the United Kingdom: 3 
A Constitution is the set of the most important rules that regulate the relations among the 
different parts of the government of a given country and also the relations between the parts of 
the government and the people of the country. 
You will see that this definition is a lean and positivist beast.  Gone are the 
requirements for internal coherence and conformity with "reason", so too the consent of 
the people.  The "rules" of this definition could, it seems, be of the most arbitrary and 
incoherent kind and be obeyed mainly or entirely from fear of oppression.  King would 
still find a "Constitution" ­ though he would doubtless view it as a very bad one. 
The two approaches have implications for the role of legal scholarship, which 
Professor Simmonds has recently and helpfully considered and described in this way: 4 
On the one hand was a tradition that viewed law as the gradual working out of principles that 
trace the structure of a pre­existing, if inchoate, body of rights.  This tradition could ascribe an 
important role to the doctrinal writer, whose task was (so far as possible) to present each 
individual rule as one fragment of the broader system of right ... On the other hand was a 
Hobbesian tradition, emphasising the groundedness of law in authority, and problematising or 
rejecting the role of the non­authoritative doctrinal writer. 
The approaches point towards two different conceptions of the task of constitution­ 
making.  One begins with what I have elsewhere called "the architectural metaphor". 5 
On that view, Constitutions are "designed" by political leaders and philosophers 
whose objective is the betterment of society by the formulation of fundamental rules 
judged to be beneficial.  The result succeeds or fails in accordance with the vision and 
wisdom of the designer.  At the Conference which some of us attended in the Legislative 
Council Chamber across the road, two years ago, I suggested an alternative metaphor ­ 
not because I rejected the undoubted utility of rational law­making, but to balance the 
3 King, above, 1. 
4 Nigel E Simmonds "Protestant Jurisprudence and Modern Doctrinal Scholarship" (2001) 60 CLJ 
271, 284. 
5 Alex Frame "Beware the Architectural Metaphor" in Colin James (ed) Building the Constitution 
(Institute of Policy Studies, Wellington, 2000) 427.  The volume collects the Papers presented at the 
"Building the Constitution" Conference held on 7­8 April in the Legislative Council Chamber of 
Parliament Buildings in Wellington.
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dangers that "architects" may lose touch with that reservoir of support and determination 
in the hearts of the people without which law becomes an alien imposition likely to be 
abandoned when circumstances permit: 6 
While I do not discount the value of rational law­making, I would place equal importance on 
another metaphor ­ that of scholars lovingly excavating and uncovering the institutions and 
values of our peoples with a view to adapting and renewing the best of these for our present 
and joint needs. 
Architects sit at their drawing­boards and attempt to create principles, structures, and 
processes informed by reason.  Excavators try to discover the customary ways underlying 
a particular society, and to bring these to prominence and coherence.  Of course, in the 
real world, these are two poles in between which there is a practical continuum.  Even the 
most inspired architect is likely to pay some attention to the social context, and the most 
reverential excavator will give thought to the possibility of useful innovation. 
Nevertheless, attention to the poles may assist us in finding the right balance between 
these approaches. 
II OF ARCHITECTS 
On the evening of Monday, 22 August 1892, an "enthusiastic meeting of Wellington 
Citizens" gathered in the Columbia Skating Rink ­ the Vivian Street site, which was 
Wellington's great indoor gathering place before the building of the Town Hall ­ to 
congratulate Sir George Grey on his eightieth birthday.  Flags flew, the Garrison Band 
blared, and leading politicians such as soon­to­be Premier Richard Seddon, Downie 
Stewart, and HD Bell attended.  The Great Man himself spoke at length to the Meeting 
and his words were recorded for posterity, by the New Zealand Herald's reporter. 7 
6 Frame, above, 431. 
7 (24 August 1892) New Zealand Herald, Auckland.  Over 2000 attended and the warmth of the well­ 
wishers is unmistakable.  The Evening Post carried a briefer report, noting that "Sir George detailed 
how the Constitution Act of the Colony was framed by himself in a tent on the bank of the 
Wanganui River ..." (23 August 1892) The Evening Post, Wellington.  The New Zealand Times of 23 
August 1892 reports Sir George verbatim in language close to that of the New Zealand Herald, with 
this further quotation: 
He did not know why, now he was 80 years of age, he need be ashamed that he had 
taken those pains, undergone solitude, lived alone with nature and his Maker, free from 
all worldly thoughts as what the effect would be in preparing that despatch.  The 
despatch was sent Home, and was adopted without difficulty by Parliament with one 
change, that relating to the Legislative Council.  That Constitution became the model of 
the Canadian Constitution. 
(23 August 1892) The New Zealand Times, Auckland.  This was not the only occasion on which Sir 
George Grey expanded on his role in the making of the 1852 Constitution.  Alexander McLintock
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Now, I don't mind telling you how the New Zealand Constitution was planned ... Having been 
charged by the British Parliament with the duty of drawing up this plan, I felt that I had a 
sacred duty to New Zealand to perform of the most portentous kind, and I resolved that, 
uninfluenced by any other person's views, undisturbed by the Press, undisturbed in any way, I 
would go out in the wilderness as it were, and fearlessly brave all its novelties ... And I set off 
to Wanganui accompanied by about six or seven natives, crossed the river, and went to the foot 
of Mount Ruapehu, and spent some time there alone ... living in a little bit of a tent, having very 
little food, and in every way undisturbed, I wrote the document which was sent home and 
secured that Constitution for New Zealand. (Cheers).  I proposed to go on to Auckland with it 
but by ill fate was induced to determine to ascend the Ruapehu ... I went to the top of the 
Mountain.  Seeing me there, the natives became alarmed, and, as they were afraid the taipo 
would attack them for violating the tapu, I had to go back with the letter to Wellington, and it 
was from this town that the documents were despatched.  Now that is the true history.  I never 
made it public, I do not know why ... 
Here is the Architect par excellence at work – wild places and mountain tops are 
favoured places for the activity.  It seems that only Maori had any say in the project ­ and 
they only marginally!  I am afraid that we learn also from the somewhat grating tone of 
the remarks why Sir George Grey could on occasion irritate rather than enlist the 
sympathies of some of his fellow citizens. 
The "despatch" to which Grey refers as the seminal document, seems to be that of 30 
August 1851, 8 sent from "Government House, Wellington" to Sir George's immediate 
mentions two others in his Crown Colony Government in New Zealand (Government Printer, 
Wellington, 1958) 331­332.  McLintock is critical of Grey's more extravagant claims, but does 
concede, at 332, that, "it is incontestable that Grey, in a long series of dispatches, did impart to the 
constitution a great deal of its character". 
8 "Papers Relative to the Proposed Constitution of New Zealand" (30 August 1851) in British 
Parliamentary Papers: Papers Relating to New Zealand: Vol 8, 18.  Although I have not been able to 
document Sir George Grey's journey to Wanganui and Ruapehu (which must presumably have 
occurred in the winter of 1851 and before August 30th), one clue that connects the despatch with 
such a journey is found in paras 19 and 20 where Sir George writes with obvious first­hand 
knowledge: 
[I]t may be stated that the centre of (the North) island is occupied by a mountain range 
covered with perpetual snow, having as one of its peaks a volcano of boiling water.  The 
snows which cover this range form perpetual springs from which rivers of cold and 
pure water are thrown off in all directions to the coast ... The central mountain range 
throws off also spurs or ridges of very difficult mountainous country in various 
directions to the coast ... 
More conclusive is a pamphlet in the Turnbull Library "The Constitution of New Zealand: 
Despatch from Sir George Grey to the Rt Hon Earl Grey" (ATL, Pam 1891).  The Turnbull Library
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superior in London, Earl Grey, and containing several interesting observations and 
recommendations on the measure which the London Parliament was to enact to replace 
the aborted 1846 Act, which Grey had on his own authority declined to apply in New 
Zealand in what must surely be one of the most extraordinary acts of disobedience by a 
civil servant to a Statute of the Imperial Parliament duly assented to by Queen Victoria. 
The 1846 Act and the Royal Instructions that accompanied it would have confined 
recognition of Maori claims to land to those areas actually occupied, treating everything 
beyond as "waste lands of the Crown".  Sir George Grey's commendable stand was taken 
principally on the basis that this conflicted with the understandings in and behind the 
Treaty of Waitangi and would have, in any case, been impossible to enforce without a 
war against Maori, which he believed to be both unjust and unwinnable. 
It is difficult not to admire the clear thinking and writing of our great jurist, Sir John 
Salmond.  Two surprises lie in wait, however, for the student of Salmond's law designing 
roles in the South Pacific ­ in the Cook Islands and Samoa. 9 The first is that Sir John 
appears never to have set foot in either territory, and to have made only the most general 
inquiries concerning local traditions and conditions before preparing his comprehensive 
codes in 1914 and 1920 respectively ­ incidentally, working in this very building where 
we confer to honour the great contribution of Sir Ivor Richardson to our law.  The second 
surprise, must, however be that important elements of the conceptual foundations of 
those codes survive today, long after the power to revoke or modify those elements has 
passed to independent legislatures to which indigenous advice is available. There could 
be two explanations for this longevity of Salmond's foundations.  First, that Salmond was 
right in his assumption that good legal principles can be deduced in the abstract and 
successfully applied to heterogeneous social circumstances, in the same way that the laws 
of physics are efficacious.  The principles survive because they are the best possible.  A 
second explanation might be that just about any principles ­ no matter how foreign or 
even dysfunctional at inception ­ are better than none, and can in time acquire the patina 
copy is inscribed by Sir George Grey to "G Didsbury with Sir G Grey's regards".  The "despatch" 
printed in the pamphlet is that of 30 August 1851 and the "preface" states that: 
The result of that despatch was the enactment by the British Parliament of … (the New 
Zealand Constitution Act 1852) … The objects specially contemplated in drafting that 
constitution had been to do away with various restrictions upon freedom of election and 
legislation, which at that date had prevailed.  To do away with the necessity for any 
special rank, or money, or property qualifications, to enable a person to enter a 
legislative body … To establish Provinces with the most ample powers of local self­ 
government … 
9 The circumstances are more fully dealt with in Chapter 13 of my book, Alex Frame Salmond: 
Southern Jurist (Victoria University Press, Wellington, 1995).
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of customary usage. 10 Would­be reformers seeking to return to "authentic" custom now 
seem themselves to be interfering with ancient ways.  The principles ­ revolutionary at 
their inception ­ survive because they have become customary and are now protected by 
conservative inertia. 
I should say immediately that I favour the second explanation over the first.  Here is 
the reconciling bridge between the Architects and the Excavators ­ given time and 
stability, they can end up in the same place.  The question squarely raised by the 
foregoing is: under what circumstances will design, even novel design, come in time to 
claim that place in the hearts of the people reserved for custom and from which grows 
the determination to defend institutions and principles against enemies internal and 
external?  Conversely, under what circumstances will design prove to be no more than 
sky­geometry which may be shown by time to compound its ineffectiveness with cruelty 
­ by dangling an illusion before those who almost invariably suffer the most from 
constitutional failure ­ the poor and the powerless?  Sergei Kovalov told a meeting of 
Human Rights Watch in New York, in 1996: 11 
I can count on my fingers all the lawyers in the former Soviet Union who had the courage to 
speak out for the rule of law ... Scientists did better because they were able to preserve their 
academic independence. 
The Soviet Union had a Constitution ­ chockfull of "rights" and the "rule of law".  It 
failed because it never became the object of that reservoir of support and determination in 
the hearts of the people (or even of its lawyers) which rulers of all kinds fear, and which 
no amount of force can in the end overcome. 
III OF EXCAVATORS 
Our constitution in New Zealand has two features, which make it particularly suitable 
for the excavating method of development.  First, the vital role of what Dicey called 
"conventions of the constitution" ­ rules which determine events notwithstanding that the 
Courts play no part in their enforcement.  As Dicey's description implies, these rules 
depend upon acceptance for their efficacy and cannot be understood without knowledge 
of the historical circumstances in which they arose and are maintained.  A second feature 
favouring an historical approach to constitutional development is the continuing vitality 
of the common law, as declared by the Courts as a component of our legal system. 
10 See for example, the way in which the Missionary­inspired Pomare Code proclaimed in Tahiti on 13 
May 1819 has come to be seen as indigenous, as described by Professor Bruno Saura in "Customary 
Rules in French Polynesia" in Paul De Deckker and Jean­Yves Faberon (eds) Custom and the Law 
(Asia Pacific Press, Canberra, 2001) 81. 
11 Sergei Kovalov "On the New Russia" (April 10 1996) New York Review of Books 10.
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Statute and the common law were the two sources of our legal system.  In origin, the 
common law was simply the declaration of custom as it was found to be when filtered in 
accordance with some evidentiary rules applied by the Courts. 12 It is not surprising, 
therefore, to find Judges trained in our common law system well accustomed to the 
excavating method, and conscious also of the dynamic nature of custom and social 
values.  In a remarkable speech in 1994, Sir Ivor Richardson expressed that awareness in 
this way: 13 
Any survey of democracies shows that different societies give different emphases to different 
values and that the emphases may change over time.  For example, as between individuality 
and community; national identity and pluralism; the collective will and minorities; diversity 
and unity; individual autonomy and social cohesion; competition and cooperation; change and 
stability; conformity and tolerance; independence and security; civil rights and economic 
wellbeing; fairness and efficiency; rights and responsibilities; just deserts and social justice.  It 
is not a matter of selecting one and rejecting the other.  Rather it is a matter of arriving at the 
balance for that society on that particular continuum.  And that balance will itself change in 
response to changing social values and needs. 
A second example of the subtle way in which our Constitution changes, may be 
noted.  Careful watchers of the most helpful and influential short statement of our 
constitutional principles ­ the Introduction to the Cabinet Manual ­ may have noticed an 
interesting change between the 1996 and 2001 editions.  In 1996, the section titled "Other 
Sources of the Constitution" made no reference to the Treaty of Waitangi, although the 
strong effect of that document on "legal polity" was helpfully referred to in a section 
discussing the ways in which "individuals and communities … participate directly in 
political and governmental processes important to them".  The 2001 edition, however, has 
moved that discussion of the political effect of the Treaty to the "Other Sources of the 
Constitution" section.  This re­classification of the Treaty of Waitangi is both appropriate 
and significant ­ if I may say so, it is a good example of the excavating method.  New 
Zealand attitudes to the Treaty have changed, and it has become clear in a way that was 
not previously evident, that all branches and all levels of government, and significant 
sections of our people, view the Treaty as a founding constitutional document. 14 In the 
12 See Sir John W Salmond Jurisprudence (7 ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1924) 207.  Salmond notes 
that the original nature of common law became submerged, as the activity of the Courts produced 
a body of case law.  In another example of constitutional law following constitutional fact, the 
common law became that body of case law (see Salmond, above, 225­226). 
13 Rt Hon Sir Ivor Richardson "The Courts and the Public" (1995) NZLJ 11, 12.  The speech was first 
delivered to the Australian Institute of Judicial Administration in November 1994. 
14 Cabinet Manual (Cabinet Office, Wellington, 1996 and 2001).  See the introductory note, titled "On 
the Constitution of New Zealand: An Introduction to the Foundations of the Current Form of
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face of that, the formal legal doctrine under which Treaties, including that of Waitangi, 
are not directly a source of law in New Zealand gives way to constitutional fact. 15 It was 
Sir John Salmond, writing exactly one hundred years ago, who reminded us that: 16 
The constitution as a matter of fact is logically prior to the constitution as a matter of law.  In 
other words, constitutional practice is logically prior to constitutional law.  There may be a 
state and a constitution without any law, but there can be no law without a state and a 
constitution.  No constitution, therefore, can have its source and basis in the law.  It has of 
necessity an extra­legal origin, for there can be no talk of law, until some form of constitution 
has already obtained de facto establishment by way of actual usage and operation.  When it is 
once established, but not before, the law can, and will, take notice of it.  Constitutional facts 
will be reflected with more or less accuracy in courts of justice as constitutional law ... 
The Cabinet Manual has properly noted a change in constitutional fact.  Excavators 
are at work!  The possibility that legal doctrine as expounded by the Courts may need 
time to take account of that change and weave it into the fabric of the law was anticipated 
in Salmond's analysis. 
Two distinguished members of the Law Faculty of Victoria University, Professors 
Aikman and Quentin­Baxter, played leading advisory roles in the preparation and 
drafting of the Constitutions of the Cook Islands and Niue in the mid 1960's and 70's 
respectively, as those territories moved to their current status of associated statehood. 
Having been engaged over a long period in advising on the interpretation, and on some 
occasions, amendment, of those founding instruments, I have come to admire their 
elegance and integrity.  Although these constitutions had a degree of design forced upon 
them by circumstance, they were much more reflective than Sir John Salmond's codes of 
what the American anthropologist Clifford Geertz would call "local knowledge", and 
went to considerable trouble to incorporate local institutions ­ for example, in the case of 
Government".  The document derives its influence both from the eminence of its author, the Rt 
Hon Sir Kenneth Keith, and from the authority and strategic position of its primary audience, 
government itself.  For a helpful discussion of the status of the Manual, see Elizabeth McLeay, 
"What is the Constitutional Status of the New Zealand Cabinet Office Manual" (1999) 10 Public L R 
11­17.  For the point made in the text, compare page 4 of the 1996 Cabinet Office Manual with page 2 
of the 2001 Manual. 
15 I refer of course to the doctrine most bindingly articulated in relation to the Treaty of Waitangi by 
the Privy Council in Hoani Te Heuheu Tukino v Aotea District Maori Land Board [1941] AC 308 (PC). 
The doctrine has been acknowledged by the New Zealand Court of Appeal as an insuperable 
barrier to direct enforcement by the Courts of the Treaty of Waitangi, see New Zealand Maori 
Council v Attorney­General [1987] 1 NZLR 641 (CA) and the observation of the then Cooke P at 655. 
16 Sir John W Salmond Jurisprudence (7 ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1924) 154.
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the Cook Islands, the House of Ariki, and the traditional villages, in the case of Niue.  In 
1991, I was engaged as Special Counsel to advise the Constitutional Review Committee of 
the Niue Assembly on proposals to amend the Niue Constitution enacted in 1974. 
Working in Alofi, I asked to see any previous materials held there relevant to the 
preparation of the 1974 Constitution.  In a cardboard box brought to me, I found some 
fading typewritten pages containing what appeared to be a transcript of comments by 
Professor Quentin­Baxter to the Niue Assembly on 21 January 1976 on the occasion of a 
meeting to review the operation of the Constitution which had entered into force on 19 
October 1974.  The presentation, which dealt with specific concerns and questions raised 
by the Niuean legislators, began with these words: 
You could think of the Constitution as being a little like the land and the sea of your own 
island.  The land and the sea, the trees and the sunshine, sometimes a little rain, are what make 
up the basis of your lives.  They are what you build upon.  And yet, the land and the sea are 
nothing unless there are men and women here to thank God for them, to cherish their own 
culture and traditions and to move forward into the future.  It is the life of the people that gives 
a meaning to the land.  So too with the Constitution, it should be a solid basis for your lives, as 
reliable and as firm as the coral rock of the island itself and yet, without life and without the 
desire to work it, without men and women considering new questions, living in the spirit of the 
Constitution, it is only words on a piece of paper. 
The comment, finely tuned to its Niuean audience, also captures the vital link 
between constitution and culture, which I have tried to emphasise in this paper. 
IV A REPORT ON EXPERIENCE ­ ADVISING IN THE COOK ISLANDS 
In this section, I must admit to being a small­time excavator.  It has been a privilege to 
have been asked by successive Solicitors­General of the Cook Islands under successive 
Governments to advise from time­to­time, over a twenty year period, on issues arising 
under or in relation to the Constitution of the Cook Islands.  Some sixty­five legal opinions 
and other papers tendered to or through the Crown Law Office in response to these 
requests are indexed and bound in two volumes held in the Crown Law Office in 
Rarotonga.  They are of course confidential to the Cook Islands Law Officers unless that 
status is waived by the Officers. 
The present Solicitor­General of the Cook Islands, Janet Maki, has very kindly 
consented to release in this Paper of the opinion of 2 July 1999, relating to the powers and 
functions of the Queen's Representative in a post­election situation, on the basis that the 
opinion was by arrangement made available in July 1999 to the leaders of all political 
parties to have won seats in the 1999 elections and is, therefore, already a semi­public 
document.  Secondly, Solicitor­General Maki took the view that the opinion related to 
general issues of public law, which were properly a matter of public interest.  The
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opinion provides a useful illustration of some of the central issues arising from so­called 
"Westminster model", supreme­law, written constitutions in the Pacific. 17 
His Excellency Sir Apenera Short KBE, 
Queen's Representative, 
Rarotonga, 
COOK ISLANDS 
Friday 2 July 1999 
Dear Sir Apenera, 
I had been asked by the Solicitor­General, Ms Janet Maki, whose Office has the responsibility 
for advising Your Excellency on legal matters, 18 to prepare a Paper which might be of some 
assistance to Your Excellency in exercising the functions and powers provided in the 
Constitution in relation to post­election situations where it might not be immediately clear 
whether the Ministry which had enjoyed the confidence of a majority of the outgoing 
Parliament could continue in office after the election, and in due course submit itself to the will 
of the majority in the Parliament to be formed. 
1 Interpretation of the Powers in the Constitution 
1.1.  The Constitution of the Cook Islands is a written constitution, and it is declared to be the 
"supreme law" of the Cook Islands. 19 No other law or practice, of whatever origin, which is 
contrary to or inconsistent with the Constitution, can be given effect to by Cook Islands Courts. 
Some other parts of the Commonwealth have similar constitutions, and principles have 
emerged as to the approach which is properly taken to their interpretation.  These may be 
17 The expression "Westminster model" is a curious one.  The explicit status as supreme law, and the 
codified form of the post­war Commonwealth constitutions, not to mention the presence of 
"fundamental freedoms", distinguishes them fundamentally from the traditional London pattern. 
My former colleague, Professor Ralph Carnegie of the University of the West Indies has observed 
in this connection: 
[t]hat psychological comfort still has a part to play in constitutional design is no doubt 
too obvious for any warning to be needed against denying its value ... when we speak of 
our Westminster model Constitutions, we are not being lawyers or even political 
scientists.  We are at best being poets.  Ralph Carnegie "Floreat the Westminster Model? 
A Commonwealth Caribbean Perspective" in Meeting of Law Officers of Small 
Commonwealth Jurisdictions ­ 5­9 December 1988 (Commonwealth Secretariat, London, 
1998). 
The designation can be expected to persist, however, see for example Lord Dilhorne's description 
of the term as "felicitous" in Hinds v The Queen [1976] 1 All ER 353 (HL). 
18 Crown Law Office Act 1980 (CI), s 10 
19 Cook Islands Constitution Act 1964 (NZ), s 4.
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summarised by saying that the Constitution is to be viewed as being in a class of its own and 
not necessarily subject to technical rules of statutory construction, but is rather to be given a 
broad and generous interpretation.  One distinguished Judge has said that: 20 
Respect must be paid to the language which has been used and to the traditions and 
usages which have given meaning to that language. 
1.2.  These words remind us that the core concepts of responsible government, parliamentary 
supremacy, and constitutional monarchy, which lie at the heart of the Cook Islands 
Constitution, have a long history of development within the Commonwealth ­ one which was 
certainly present to the minds of those leaders and advisers who shaped the Cook Islands 
document.  A careful and cautious reference to the "traditions and usages" which lie behind the 
Constitution will therefore be appropriate to reaching an understanding of the language of the 
Constitution and to giving it proper effect. 
1.3.  However, the Cook Islands Court of Appeal has underlined the dangers of importing the 
principles and practices of other systems into the Cook Islands context.  The Court has stated 
that the drafters of the Cook Islands Constitution: 21 
have attempted to spell out in some detail the powers, principles and procedures 
which in other systems, such as those of New Zealand and the United Kingdom, are 
left to practice ... It should not be assumed that the traditional models have been 
carried over without change.  As the Privy Council warned we should guard against 
forcing the new constitutional language into a traditional pattern if it does not fit. 
1.4.  The conclusion must therefore be that the constitutional conventions which supply the 
framework for the formation and operation of government in the United Kingdom and in New 
Zealand ­ where there are no single, "written", supreme law, constitutions of the Cook Islands 
type ­ must be approached with caution in the Cook Islands.  There may be room for allowing 
such conventions to fill out or colour the rules of the Constitution where these may be 
incomplete or unclear, but not to modify or qualify rules in the Constitution which are on their 
face clear and complete. 22 
2 The Cook Islands Court of Appeal's 1983 Explanation of the Constitutional Rules for the 
Formation of Government 
20 Minister of Home Affairs v Fisher [1980] AC 319, 329 (HL) Lord Diplock. 
21 Reference by the Queen's Representative [1985] LRC (Const) 56, 71­72. 
22 The same conclusion has been expressed to the present writer by the well­known Pacific 
constitutional adviser, Dr Colin Aikman, with respect to the Samoan Constitution.
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2.1.  The most authoritative interpretation of the intent and meaning of Articles 13 and 14 of the 
Constitution is to be found in the 1983 judgment of the Cook Islands Court of Appeal in 
Reference by the Queen's Representative [1985] LRC (Const.) 56.  That Court consisted of Sir 
Graham Speight CJ, the late Dillon J., and perhaps the most eminent present­day New Zealand 
constitutional authority, Keith J., as Sir Kenneth Keith of the New Zealand Court of Appeal 
then was. 
2.2.  Referring to Article 14 (1) of the Constitution as it then was, the Court said: 23 
The Queen's Representative has a discretion to terminate the appointment of the 
Prime Minister who was in office at the time of the election ("the holdover Prime 
Minister").  The draftsmen have not stated grounds for the exercise of this power ... 
2.3.  The Court of Appeal made two clear findings.  First, that when Parliament is in session, 
only an actual expression of its will expressed in a vote, or in "some other unequivocal act", will 
satisfy the requirement in Article 13 (2) (a) that the Queen's Representative appoint as Prime 
Minister "a person who commands the confidence of a majority of the members of Parliament". 
This interpretation was said by the Court to be in keeping with the tenor of the "South Pacific 
model" which was seen as giving to Parliament "the central role in selecting the Prime 
Minister".  However, when the Court came to discuss the other two situations covered in 
Article 13 (2) (b) and (c) ­ when Parliament is not in session or is dissolved ­ it recognised that, 
by definition, there would be no existing Parliament: 
In the nature of things there can be no contemporaneous Parliamentary approval of the Prime 
Minister appointed at these times. 
2.4.  Referring to Article 13 (2) (b), and the power of the Queen's Representative to appoint as 
Prime Minister a member of Parliament who in his opinion, "acting in his discretion, is likely to 
command the confidence of a majority of the members of Parliament", the Court of Appeal said 
that: 24 
These phrases and the timing clearly indicate that the Queen's Representative in these 
cases will have to make his own best estimate.  The party situation may make his task 
simple.  If it does not, he will have to draw on his own good sense and political 
sensitivity and that of the other main actors ... There can however be no guarantee that 
23 Reference by the Queen's Representative, above, 65.  The expression "holdover Prime Minister" thus 
has the stamp of judicial support and will be used throughout this Paper.  The original form of 
Article 14(1) simply gave discretion to terminate the appointment of the "holdover" Premier in the 
gap between the election and the meeting of Parliament.  By effect of the Constitution Amendment 
(No 15) Act 1993, the present formula, requiring the Head of State to form the view that the Prime 
Minister is "unlikely to command a majority ..." was added. 
24 Reference by the Queen's Representative, above, 63.
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his judgment will turn out to be the correct one, and, even if correct to begin with, 
alignments may change before Parliament first meets. 
2.5.  The second major finding of the Court of Appeal in 1983 was that Article 14 (2) of the 
Constitution (since repealed), which at that time automatically terminated the appointment of 
the "holdover Prime Minister" seven days after the meeting of the new Parliament after an 
election, also applied to a Prime Minister who had been appointed after the election under 
Article 13 (2) (b) as being "likely to command a majority". 
2.6.  The significance of the 1983 decision continues to be the identification by the Court of 
Appeal of the "central role for Parliament" in the selection of the Prime Minister in the "South 
Pacific model" of Constitution.  The Court of Appeal said: 25 
... according to the Constitution it is the Parliament that in reality chooses the Prime 
Minister.  The power of the Queen's Representative is a temporary and limited one.  If 
he makes an appointment after the election and before the Parliament meets or if he 
leaves the holdover Prime Minister in office, Parliament must confirm that decision or 
in effect choose a new Prime Minister. 
That observation by the Court also makes it clear that one option available to the Queen's 
Representative is to leave the holdover Prime Minister in office pending the first session of the 
new Parliament.  In that circumstance, no occasion arises for the exercise of the Article 13(2)(b) 
power: the holdover Prime Minister meets the new Parliament and submits to its vote under 
Article 13(2)(a). 
3 The Discretions of the Queen's Representative After an Election 
3.1.  Article 14 (1) provides that the Queen's Representative may terminate the appointment of 
the holdover Prime Minister: 
if it appears to the Queen's Representative, acting in his discretion, that the Prime 
Minister is unlikely to command the confidence of a majority of the members of 
Parliament. 
3.2.  The "unlikely to command" test was inserted in 1993 by an amendment to the Constitution. 
At the same time, the original Article 14 (2), which had been held by the Court of Appeal to 
require the Prime Minister to resign or to lose office by operation of law seven days after the 
meeting of the post­election Parliament, was repealed. 
3.3.  That repeal has taken away the mandatory termination of the Prime Minister's 
appointment seven days into the first post­election session of Parliament.  However, it is 
suggested that the position of the holdover Prime Minister will be tested as soon as Parliament 
25 Reference by the Queen's Representative, above, 72.
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meets, either by a motion of confidence moved by the Prime Minister, or by a motion of no­ 
confidence moved by an opponent. 
3.4.  It is most important to stress that the Queen's Representative is entitled to exercise the 
post­election discretions independently.  Indeed, in a 1986 case, 26 the Supreme Court of 
Malaysia had to consider circumstances in which pressure had been put on the Head of State in 
the exercise of functions similar to those in the Cook Islands Constitution.  A number of 
interesting points emerge from the Court's judgment.  First, the manner in which the power 
conferred on the Head of State was exercised was not open to judicial review except on the 
ground that it exceeded the constitutional provisions themselves. Secondly, and in reference to 
the attempts to pressure the Head of State, the Court stated that: 27 
the Head of State must be allowed to make his judgment quietly, independently, and 
in a dignified manner, as intended by the Constitution. 
3.5.  Indeed, in the Mustapha case, the Court found that the cumulative effect of the pressure on 
the Head of State was such as to invalidate the appointment which it produced.  The 
significance of the decision would therefore appear to be that the Queen's Representative's 
discretions require him to make his judgment on material which he considers relevant, and that 
he is entitled to make his decision independently and without pressure. 
4 Applying the "unlikely to command" Test 
4.1.When might the occasion arise for the termination of the appointment of the "holdover 
Prime Minister" under the discretion vested in the Queen's Representative where he forms the 
view that the Prime Minister "is unlikely to command the confidence of a majority of the 
members of Parliament"? Three questions would appear to arise: 
(1) On what information may the Queen's Representative form his view? 
(2) What standard is set by the "unlikely to command the confidence" test? 
(3) Which "members of Parliament" should his Excellency have in mind in applying the test? 
4.2. Question 1 ­ On what information? The approach of the Cook Islands Court of Appeal in 
1983 to the Article 14 (1) and Article 13 (2) (b) discretions was that the Queen's Representative 
would have to make "his own best estimate", and that His Excellency would need in both 
circumstances to draw on information available from public statements, and also on 
information gathered from his own inquiries made of the key players. 
26 Mustapha v Mohammad and Another [1987] LRC (Const) 16. 
27 Mustapha, above, 126.
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4.3.  The New Zealand Governor­General, Sir Michael Hardie Boys, formerly a judge of the 
New Zealand Court of Appeal, has recently made two interesting speeches on his 
understanding of his functions and powers under the conventions and principles concerning 
the formation of Government in New Zealand.  In April 1996, His Excellency gave a widely 
reported speech the aim of which was: 28 
to ensure, so far as possible, that the principles and processes for moving from the 
election to the formation and appointment of a new Government were clear, and 
understood by a sufficient number, so that the focus of public attention could be 
where it belonged ­ on the political actors who would be required to negotiate and 
work together to reach a political resolution. 
4.4. The vital point underlined is that responsibility lies with politicians to resolve the 
situation, and to send clear public signals to enable the Head of State, acting in a non­political 
role, to play the formal constitutional role.  The role of the Head of State should normally be 
one of ratifying the arrangements reached and declared by the political leaders. 
4.5.  Sir Michael went on to list what His Excellency described as a "few simple points": 29 
The formation of a Government is a political decision and must be arrived at by 
politicians.  My task as Governor­General is to ascertain where the support of the 
House lies. In an unclear situation, that might require me to communicate with the 
leaders of all of the parties represented in Parliament. 
Once political parties have reached an adequate accommodation, and a Government is 
able to be formed or confirmed, the parties could be expected to make that clear by 
appropriate public announcements of their intentions. At that point it might be 
necessary for me to talk with some party leaders.  I would then expect to have 
sufficient information to be able to appoint a new Prime Minister, if that were 
required. 
Throughout this period of negotiation, the incumbent Prime Minister remains in office, 
governing in accordance with the caretaker convention (under which the incumbent 
Government remains the lawful executive authority, but constrains its actions until 
the political situation is resolved and a successor is appointed.) 
28 The summary of the 1996 speech by Governor­General Hardie Boys was provided in a second 
speech, given on 3 December 1998, at the Institute of Policy Studies Seminar in Wellington.  The 
1998 speech was titled Rt Hon Sir Michael Hardie Boys "The Constitutional Challenges of MMP: A 
Magical Demystification Tour" (Speech presented to the Institute of Policy Studies Seminar, 
Government House, Wellington, 1998) 2. 
29 "Magical Demystification Tour", above, 2­ 3.
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The "caretaker" issue needs to be approached carefully for reasons given at the beginning of 
this Paper, and will be addressed below. 
4.6. Question 2 ­ What does "unlikely" mean? It is suggested that "unlikely" does not mean 
merely "possible".  In a post­election period it might be "possible" that, if election petitions have 
certain outcomes, and if reported discontent within parties is later reflected in changes in party 
membership, or allegiances change for whatever reasons, the holdover Prime Minister might 
not receive the support of a majority in the Parliament to be.  But it is submitted that these mere 
possibilities will not suffice to trigger Article 14 (1), and that to exercise the discretion against 
the holdover Prime Minister, the Queen's Representative needs to conclude that, on all the 
properly available information, a mere "possibility" has escalated to "probability".  It need not 
move to "certainty", but it must seem to the Queen's Representative that there are good reasons 
for believing that possibilities will be realised in such a way that the hold­over Prime Minister 
will not command majority support in the Parliament to be formed. 
4.7. Question 3 ­ Which "Members of Parliament" should be in mind?It is submitted that the logic 
imposed by the primacy of the role of Parliament in the selection of the Prime Minister ­ as 
affirmed by the Court of Appeal in 1983 ­ points clearly in the direction of the members of the 
Parliament­to­be as the reference point for the 14 (1) discretion.  The Queen's Representative 
has already had to estimate what members might do ­ now, he also might have broadly to 
estimate the composition of the Parliament to be.  His Excellency, as head of the Executive 
branch of government, will not wish to anticipate the result of particular election petitions 
before the Judicial branch, but as these are progressively determined, a picture will begin to 
emerge.  In the meantime, the Queen's Representative's 14(1) "radar" remains switched on, 
ready to assess any circumstances which indicate that it is "unlikely" that the holdover Prime 
Minister will command majority support in the Parliament­to­be. 
4.8.  It is suggested that a possible approach by His Excellency will be to put the seats subject to 
election petition to one side until they are progressively decided (within the meaning of Article 
29(2) of the Constitution).  For the moment the petitions signify only possibilities, not the 
probabilities which, it was argued in paragraph 4.6 above, are required for the operation of 
Article 14(1), and Article 13 (2) (b).  His Excellency might however be entitled to bear in mind 
that, historically, election petitions go both ways ­ some are successful and some not.  Without 
prejudging any particular petition ­ which would be inappropriate ­ the Queen's 
Representative might provisionally regard them collectively as neutral for the purpose of 
assessing probabilities.  All that the Queen's Representative can do is to note that there could 
be some changes from the initial election results. 
4.9.  The manner in which seats under election petition are to be treated is particularly sensitive 
because it would be unfortunate if it came to be thought that the discretion of the Queen's 
Representative in the post­election situation could be manipulated by the tactical filing of 
election petitions.
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4.10.  A further factor that will no doubt be present to the mind of the Queen's Representative 
in considering the possible exercise of the Article 14 (1) discretion, is that his Excellency must 
never be without responsible advisers. 30 Therefore, if His Excellency were to terminate the 
appointment of a holdover Prime Minister, he immediately faces appointing an alternative 
under Article 13 (2) (b), for which the test is that the appointee must be "likely to command the 
confidence of a majority of the members of Parliament".  Again, and in accordance with the 
discussion in paragraph 4.6., the Queen's Representative will be concerned not with mere 
possibilities, but with probabilities. 
5 The "Caretaker Principles" 
5.1.  The Cook Islands Constitution does not explicitly contain any such concept as that of 
"caretaker Government", under which a Ministry which is for the time being unable to 
demonstrate the support of a majority of the Members of Parliament would regard itself as 
being constrained to avoid or postpone some actions which would be open to a more fully­ 
mandated Government.  However, my inquiries reveal that there are circumstances in which 
Governments in the Cook Islands have regarded themselves, in practice if not in law, as 
restrained from taking particularly significant policy measures until a clear mandate is 
confirmed by Parliamentary vote. 
5.2.  Although this does not mean that the full range or extent of the caretaker principles as 
understood in New Zealand can be imported into the Cook Islands Constitution ­ for reasons 
explained in paragraph 1 of this Paper ­ it does suggest that an embryonic practice relating to 
"caretaker government" may be developing in the Cook Islands, and may be expected to grow 
and, in time, crystallise into a form which may be stated as principles.  The New Zealand 
practice, for example, is explained in that country's "Cabinet Office Manual" as follows: 31 
A basic principle of New Zealand's system of responsible government is that the 
government must have the confidence of the House of Representatives to stay in 
office.  On occasion, however, it may be necessary for a government which does not 
clearly have that support to remain in office on an interim basis until the situation is 
clarified.  During such periods the incumbent government is still the lawful executive 
authority, with all the powers and responsibilities that go with executive office.  That 
government is required to stay in office until a successor is able to be appointed.  But 
in recognition of the fact that government may no longer have the confidence of the 
House, governments have traditionally constrained their actions until the political 
30 See Robert Quentin Quentin Baxter "The Governor­General's Constitutional Discretions: An Essay 
Towards a Re­Definition" (1980) 10 VUWLR 289, 308. 
31 Cabinet Office Manual (Cabinet Office, Wellington, 1996) 20­21.
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situation is resolved, in accordance with what is known as the convention on caretaker 
government. 
5.3.  Some observers have argued that a "holdover" Ministry ­ in the period following the 
election and before Parliament meets ­ is in such a "caretaker" situation, and have specifically 
urged that the Prime Minister ought not to offer, or the Queen's Representative to accept, 
advice under Article 13 (3) as to the appointment of Ministers to replace those who have lost 
their seats at the election. 
5.4.  I have formed the view that this argument goes too far.  It ignores the Court of Appeal's 
warning in 1983 against allowing "convention" to modify the clear words of the Constitution. 
Article 13 (3) unambiguously vests the power to advise the appointment of Ministers in the 
Prime Minister.  The Queen's Representative is given no discretion in the matter.  Furthermore, 
the specific device which is employed in the Constitution to guard against advice to the 
Queen's Representative from a Prime Minister lacking Parliamentary support is found in 
Article 37(3), which allows the Queen's Representative not to act on the Prime Minister's advice 
to dissolve Parliament: 
unless the Queen's Representative is satisfied, acting in his discretion, that in 
tendering that advice the Prime Minister commands the confidence of a majority of the 
members of Parliament. 
5.5.  In the absence of any indication that the power to advise appointment of Ministers is 
limited, there would appear to be no constitutional restriction on the power other than the 
rules of law specifying the number of, and qualifications for, Ministers.  Indeed, were the 
Queen's Representative to decline to appoint a Minister on the advice of the Prime Minister, it 
seems that the appointment would take effect by operation of law after 14 days in accordance 
with Article 5 (2) of the Constitution. 
5.6.  Finally, I do not consider that the result of the above argument is unreasonable.  It is 
difficult to see why the holdover Prime Minister should not be entitled to a "full deck" of 
Ministers to carry the various portfolios over the hold­over period.  Given the time which 
might elapse before the summoning of the post­election Parliament, it would seem proper that 
the affairs of the Cook Islands should receive the attention of the number of Ministers deemed 
by the Constitution to be necessary for the efficient conduct of the nation's business. 
6 Some Concluding Observations 
6.1.  It has been suggested, following the lead of the Cook Islands Court of Appeal, that the 
Cook Islands Constitution contains rules for the formation of Government which pivot on the 
central role for Parliament.  Out of necessity, the holdover Prime Minister or, if required, the 
Article 13(2)(b) Prime Minister, are fully empowered Heads of Government under the 
Constitution, but they are temporary tenants of the office until the all­important decision of the
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new Parliament.  Therefore, it is of great importance that Parliament be called as soon as 
possible, within the requirements of Article 29 of the Constitution.  It would be appropriate for 
the Queen's Representative to seek assurances from the holdover, or Article 13(2)(b), Prime 
Ministers that advice will be tendered as soon as the Constitution allows for the calling of 
Parliament. 
6.2.  Finally, it is perhaps worth quoting the words with which the New Zealand Governor­ 
General ended his address, quoted above, in December 1998.  His Excellency quoted Gladstone, 
the nineteenth century British Prime Minister, who wrote that the "unwritten" British 
Constitution: 
Presumes more boldly than any other, the good sense and good faith of those who 
work it. 
As has been suggested above, the Cook Islands Constitution has codified many of the rules to 
which Mr Gladstone was referring.  However, in the maintenance and formation of 
Government in between an election and the meeting of Parliament, Gladstone's observation has 
a relevance for the modern Cook Islands. 
With respectful Greetings to Your Excellency, 
yours sincerely, 
(Alex Frame) 
V A CONCLUSION 
The kind of legal activity of which I have tried to provide a concrete and practical 
example in the preceding section certainly lacks the grandeur and glamour of 
constitution­making of the architectural type.  It also lacks the authority of judicial 
pronouncement, being liable at all points to subsequent (and for the provider, 
embarrassing) contradiction by the Courts whose function it is authoritatively to declare 
the law.  Nevertheless, the formulation of first­level legal advice can provide guidance to 
the practical operation of the Constitution and a stabilising influence in uncertain times, 
whilst avoiding both the costs and divisiveness of resort to the Courts.  The tendering of 
formal legal advice to those responsible for carrying out constitutional roles normally 
takes place out of the public view: it may nevertheless justly be considered as a 
constitution­shaping activity.
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